Lucas Lixinski

Luke Beck

Michael Douglas

Aaron Moss

On 22 May 2023, the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia (Mortimer CJ, Moshinsky and Banks-Smith JJ) delivered judgment in Yunupingu on behalf of the Gumatj Clan or Estate Group v Commonwealth of Australia [2023] FCAFC 75 (Yunupingu), a decision regarding the intersection between native title and constitutional law.  

This post explores aspects of the Court's decision, and outlines their significance for public lawyers more generally.  

Craig Lenehan

Alex Deagon

In my new book, A Principled Framework for the Autonomy of Religious Communities: Reconciling Freedom and Discrimination (Hart Publishing, 2023), I give substantive content to calls for a principled approach to reconciling the sometimes-competing imperatives of religious freedom and equality, through applying theological virtues such as dignity, humility, patience, generosity, kindness, forgiveness and compassion to create a peaceful coexistence of difference. The purpose of my book is to deploy these theological virtues to reconcile the tensions between religious freedom and equality.

Fiona McDonald, Stephen Duckett and Emma Campbell

The recent Independent Review of Medicare Integrity and Compliance highlighted that ‘the current state of Medicare, and some of the challenges … are the result of previous attempts to apply discrete and band-aid solutions to single issues over time and a lack of system thinking and consideration’.

One of the issues in contemplating the reform of Medicare is the long-standing debate about whether there is a constitutional impediment to implementing major reforms. This post discusses the impact of the High Court’s evolving interpretation of the civil conscription sub-clause in s51(xxiiiA) of the Commonwealth Constitution, and the implications of that response for the current and future design of Medicare as reflected in the Health Insurance Act 1973 (Cth).

Sanmati Verma

In its important judgment in Pearson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] FCAFC 203, the Full Court of the Federal Court found that an aggregate sentence of imprisonment did not constitute a single ‘term of imprisonment for 12 months or more,’ and therefore did not attract the operation of the mandatory visa cancellation power at s 501(3A) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

This post discusses the Full Court’s decision in Pearson, the immediate legislative response by way of the Migration Amendment (Aggregate Sentences) Act 2023 (Cth), and the implications of that response – particularly for the people taken back into immigration detention as a result.

Stephen McDonald

In this post, I offer a critique of one aspect of the reasoning of the majority judges in the Commonwealth v AJL20 (‘AJL20’), where it was held that AJL20’s detention was, at all times, lawfully permitted and required by the Migration Act, notwithstanding the failure of Commonwealth officers to comply with the duty to remove him as soon as reasonably practicable.

Essentially, the majority reasoning permits and requires detention by the executive to continue, even though the purposes for which detention can occur are constitutionally limited, and even though the detention exceeds what is reasonably necessary to give effect to the permissible purposes established by the Migration Act. I argue that, in construing the Migration Act in this way, the majority in AJL20 have implicitly given it an operation that authorises and requires continuing executive detention in excess of constitutional limits if officers of the executive have failed to comply with other duties imposed on them by the Act.